Constitutions are laws about the set-up
of a community. Like all laws they are supposed to be rules for human
conduct. We read the law, and if we are law-abiding, we do what it
says. Wittgenstein, in another context, points to a problem:
“But
am I not compelled, then, to go the way I do in a chain of
inferences?” --Compelled? After all I can presumably go as I
choose!-- “ But if you want to remain in accord with the rules
you must go
this way.” – Not at all, I call this
'accord'.
– “Then you have changed the meaning of the word “accord”, or
the meaning of the rule.” --No; – who says what 'change' and
'remaining the same' mean here? However many rules you give me-- I
give a rule which justifies my employment
of your rules.
You
may think my interpretation outlandish, absurd, ridiculous, but
nothing in the written rule allows you to do so. The little marks on
the page do not force me to do this or that. How could they? I can
insist that virtually any action is in accord with the rules. What
prevents me from doing so is convention. “Certainly you can't
possibly think that doing THAT is in accord with the law.” The
general scorn of others forces me to acquiesce. We have always taken
the rule to mean thus and so! But who has always taken it thus and
so? How we “always took it” is lost in the mists of time. Writing
about that time is just more words on a page, subject to the same
mutability as the written laws. What allows the rule to have any
affect is a general agreement as to what actions accord with the rule
and what do not. But it is not the rule nor any argument about how we
have always taken it in the past that forces this agreement. It comes
only from a general willingness to agree in the course of life as it
is lived now. The rules do not allow us to escape from
conventional usage, and our agreement about conventional usage
depends upon good will. Someone who doesn't want to agree will find a
way not to. Usage is conventional because we agree on it or, in any
case acquiesce. Neither the law, nor convention, can force
agreement.
People
held power without law. How did they do it? Let us take a little
excursion. Aristotle, in The Constitution of Athens writes,
“The ancient political order that existed before Draco was as
follows: The magistrates were selected from the noble and the
wealthy.” We might ponder that “selected.” How selected? We
tend to think of something like our own elections, but this was a
very small group of people who had no media, no airplanes, in short
no way of distancing themselves from one another. They were all out
in the agora every day. No noble or wealthy citizen of Athens
ever moved to another city, so these people all knew one another
since childhood. For one reason or another, alliances formed. For one
reason or another someone became a leader without actually being
chosen in any way. That is the way when kids grow up together. They
spoke to one another day after day not in whitewashing telepromptese,
but extemporaneously. Everybody knew what shit a guy stepped into
five years ago. Everybody knew who was a fool, a hothead, a coward.
Everybody also knew who was wise, worth listening to, brave, clever.
Everybody knew who would obey whom. And most important, everybody
knew who was likely to further the interests of whom. In short a
man's human qualities emerged. Everybody already knew who was whom
just from having hung out with them for their whole lives. There
were no surprise candidates like Barak “Who-the-hell-is” Obama or
Mitt “Who-the-hell-is” Romney. Those who held the offices gained
the acquiescence of others through their personal qualities that
emerged in the course of daily public life over a lifetime. The
Greeks called these qualities of excellence virtu.
The
noble and wealthy ruled because they could afford a soldier's
equipment. The leaders emerged naturally from life lived together,
and they ruled the poor by force. The rich owned the land and the
serfs paid steep rent or had themselves and their children sold into
slavery. To the poor this quality of virtu was no virtue. But
they couldn't do anything about it. The poor obeyed out of fear, not
because of any law. Those who ruled did so because of their monopoly
of military equipment. They were rich because they were tough. They
didn't have to explain why they did what they did.
The
poor had “no share in anything,” Aristotle says. What kept them
down was military force that easily overwhelmed them. It seems like a
stable situation, but apparently it wasn't. The problem arose between
the very-rich and the barely-rich. The very-rich were the officers in
this military city, the barely-rich merely foot soldiers. The very
rich exploited the barely-rich too. Sometimes the barely-rich
interfered with the plans of the very-rich at which point the very
rich might treat them not that much differently from the way they
treated the serfs. The loyalty of the barely-rich to the very-rich
was shaky. The “Draconian” laws Draco made created a treaty of
peace between the very-rich and the barely-rich to assure that the
barely-rich would remain foot soldiers in the threatening class war
with the poor. For the very-rich needed the loyalty of the foot
soldiers if they were to maintain their military superiority. Draco
made the ability to supply oneself with a soldier's equipment the
criterion for citizenship. But you needed quite a bit more to be
appointed to office. He created a council of four hundred chosen by
lot from among the citizens. This Areopagus could judge complaints
one citizen might have with another. Thus the poorer of the rich
could bring complains against the richer. There were other rules that
favored the barely-rich-but-rich -enough-for-armor. It gave them a
way to protect themselves somewhat against the more powerful.
The
very-rich obviously agreed to this set-up only reluctantly, for it
deprived them of opportunities to exploit the barely-rich. That was
what it was supposed to do. They agreed to it only because they knew
they needed the barely-rich against the poor. In other words they
agreed to it because the threat of civil war weighed more heavily
than their “interests.” If the poor later offered no threat the
rich would again use force to take whatever they wanted. The laws
would not stop them if they thought they didn't any longer need the
less rich. They would reinterpret the laws as they wished. The laws
themselves, like all laws, are open to any interpretation, and can
only serve as a reminder that civil war looms and compels good will
and fairness in interpretation to insure the loyalty of the
barely-rich. So the whole enterprise hinges upon incipient civil war
and the rather artificial good will this inspires between different
naturally hostile classes. The law depends upon the good will of
parties who by nature mistrust one another and so harbor ill will.
They agree to read the law with a good will they don't really have
because of the threat of civil war.
Draco's
laws solidified the rule of the rich. By buying the loyalty of the
foot soldier it strengthened a repressive force. Aristotle concludes
his account of Draco's laws with, “but loans were secured on the
person of the debtor and the land was in the hands of the few.”
But repressing the poor with force apparently didn't work. Aristotle
continues with a report that the common people rose up against the
upper class and “the civil discord became violent.”
When
that happened they called in Solon. Solon's laws were a second
attempt at law, this time to take from the rich and give to the poor
to bring the civil war to an end. Repression had failed, so they
thought to compromise. The parties agreed to Solon as lawgiver
because he was from an ancient family but not that rich. His
interests seemed not to lie clearly with either party. From his
poetry one gets the idea that his interest is with the community as a
whole. Aristotle quotes him:
“I observe, and my heart is
filled with grief when I look upon the oldest land of the Ionian
world as it totters.”
The
existence of a citizen, someone who's interest is with the good of
the whole, is hereby tacitly acknowledged. By agreeing to Solon they
have agreed that it is possible to be a citizen, someone whose “heart
fills with grief” when he sees the polis in danger. But all
they have agreed to, when they agreed to accept Solon as lawgiver,
was the possibility of a citizen. Either side might, at any
time, withdraw this sobriquet from Solon himself. Indeed Aristotle
mentions this happening, or nearly happening. Solon canceled debts,
but some said some of his friends went into debt just before he did
so, reaping big rewards. Making a move he said was to help the poor,
he actually aided his own interests proving that he put his interests
above those of the community as a whole. Apparently Solon weathered
this storm whereas some well-known selfish man in his place probably
wouldn't have. His reputation pulled him through. But he saw that if
he remained he would lose his status as citizen, and the laws would
become suspect. For to people, that is to the whole city, who see
all human action as self-interested, Solon's actions would
seem self-interested too. So he left the city thus preserving his
claim to be its one true citizen.
Being
a citizen, one whose interest is with the good of the whole, and
appearing to be one after having made the laws, are two different
things. Was Solon out for himself or trying to do what was best for
the city as a whole when he canceled debts? The interests of the
rich as a whole are made up of the individual interests of the rich.
Although they regularly screw the poor they are not above screwing
one another. The rich can use laws that redress the sufferings of the
exploited poor, which always take something from the rich, to screw
others of the rich by putting themselves temporarily in the position
of the poor to take advantage of these laws. Those who knew Solon was
going to cancel debts borrowed to the hilt and made a bundle.
Neither
the rich nor the poor have any ability to assess Solon's integrity.
For both, integrity is a purely theoretical concept beyond their
experience. They both acknowledge their self-interest. They choose
Solon because he looked like a citizen and the denizens of Athens
recognized that the law needed good will to serve its purpose. The
words on the page had to have a meaning everyone thought “fair,”
and wouldn't have that meaning if written by a self-interested man.
Solon wrote laws that definitely benefited the poor. The rich
accepted these laws as part of a peace treaty. They had to believe
that their sacrifices were for the good of the whole, that is, the
peace treaty. They had to believe that Solon was wise and had the
good of the whole at heart, even though they had no feeling for the
good of the whole. They were making a trade that depended upon mutual
good faith, and this good faith would exist because everyone had
faith in Solon. For the rest of the city good faith was as unreal as
the tooth fairy. Acceptance of and trust in Solon was essential even
though what was essential in Solon, his integrity, was beyond
everyone else's experience.
So laws
are either alliances between rich people with different interests to
continue the civil war against the poor, or a peace treaty between
rich and poor to end the civil war. One might argue that all laws
are alliances of rich and less rich, for there are always people even
poorer than the poor. In Athens there were slaves and foreigners,
both unprotected by Solon's laws. A citizen lawgiver is important
whenever the poor or less rich see that their interests are different
from those of the rich, that is when the poor are class conscious.
This is often not the case, for it is usually not too difficult to
convince the barely-rich that their interests and those of the
very-rich are the same. No one seems to have worried about Draco's
bonafides. During the last quarter of the twentieth century most
Americans thought their interests were the same as those of the very
rich. Even the poor thought themselves “entrepreneurs.” Where
being barely-rich ends and being poor begins is a matter of opinion.
In any case the citizen lawgiver, where mistrust exists, must make
the laws and vanish, forcing the inhabitants of the city to think as
the citizen thinks in any dispute. The citizen lawgiver is essential
when the sides openly have different interests.
So
where does that leave our own Constitution? Americans generally
imagine the “founding fathers” bubbling over with good will,
sitting around a large solid table, and trying with their formidable
intelligences to craft or better, “hammer out,” our marvelous
system of checks and balances to protect our liberties. But at that
time the debate was all about whether or not the Constitution would
take away
American liberties. For example, here is Patrick
Henry, one of the most prominent anti-federalists speaking
against ratification.
“The
rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your
immunities and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and
privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change, so
loudly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others.”
Those
who supported the Constitution tried to calm this fear. The complex
and ingenious structure of “checks and balances” would guarantee
our freedoms, they said. The Articles of Confederation under which
the United States actually came into being was a loose affiliation of
truly independent states. There was no standing army and the
Confederate government had no power to tax citizens and no real way
to force the states to contribute. It protected freedoms quite
admirably, was nearly broke, and opened the opportunity for foreign
powers to play one state against another. The Constitution was a
proposal to “form a more perfect union,” that is, cede
sovereignty to the federal government. No one, for or against,
thought of it as protecting freedoms. Those for the Constitution
could argue, at best, that it would not take them away.
During
the Constitutional Convention Jefferson was in France. We must
remember that communication between France and the US was, in those
days, arduous. Jefferson wasn't getting daily reports. Hamilton and
Madison were the most important proponents of the Constitution. What
were their concerns? The English had remained in the Northwest
Territory (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan) longer
than they were supposed to, and Spain controlled a large part of the
Mississippi. John Jay had been sent to negotiate navigation on the
Mississippi and had been humiliated. In fact American diplomats in
general had been treated with contempt in Europe. Our founding
fathers, who look so dignified and gentlemanly to us, were bumpkins
to the incredibly refined European aristocracy. They were made to
squirm in the role of the bourgeois gentilhomme.
They were looked upon as the representatives of some rag-tag mockery
of a country--or so Hamilton and Madison said. In addition in revenge
for the revolution the English were restricting American shipping and
it seemed war was about to break out with France. With pressure from
all these sources some of the states had made private deals with
other countries, and the union seemed likely to break up.
Hamilton
argued that not only England, France and Spain, but also Holland was
a potential enemy of the Confederation. Others thought these threats
exaggerated. Jefferson, in France, tried to calm everyone on that
score. Here is Patrick
Henry again:
We are threatened
with danger for the non-payment of our debt due to France. We have
information come from an illustrious citizen of Virginia, who is now
in Paris, which disproves the suggestions of such danger. This
citizen has not been in the airy regions of theoretic speculation:
our ambassador is this worthy citizen. The ambassador of the United
States of America is not so despised as the honorable gentleman would
make us believe. A servant of a republic is as much respected as that
of a monarch. The honorable gentleman tells us that hostile fleets
are to be sent to make reprisals upon us: our ambassador tells you
that the king of France has taken into consideration to enter into
commercial regulations, on reciprocal terms, with us, which will be
of peculiar advantage to us. Does this look like hostility?....
Do you suppose the
Spanish monarch will risk a contest with the United States, when his
feeble colonies are exposed to them? Every advance the people make to
the westward, makes him tremble for Mexico and Peru. Despised as we
are among ourselves, under our present government, we are terrible to
that monarchy. If this be not a fact, it is generally said so.
We are, in the
next place, frightened by dangers from Holland. We must change our
government to escape the wrath of that republic. Holland groans under
a government like this new one. A stadtholder, sir, a Dutch
president, has brought on that country miseries which will not permit
them to collect debts with fleets or armies.
Patrick
Henry tried to minimize every threat Hamilton saw; Hamilton seems not
to have believed him. In any case Hamilton had one obvious motive —to
shift sovereignty from the states to the federal government-- that
would have made him ready to profess fear of whatever the Union would
protect against. Hamilton's interest was entirely in creating an
unbreakable union with the power to tax and raise an army. Jefferson
recounts a meeting
(page 96) with Hamilton in which Hamilton expressed his preference
for Julius Caesar over Enlightenment luminaries Jefferson admired. He
called Caesar the greatest man who ever lived. Jefferson told
Washington that Hamilton had asserted that only force and interest
could rule men. Unless Jefferson was lying, Hamilton had no faith in
the Constitutional Government's complex structure, but went along
with it to centralize the government. It is hard not to see Hamilton
having used Madison to argue to the other Enlightenment influenced
men for the checks and balances where he could not. Henry and
Hamilton both fixed their eyes firmly upon who was to control
military force. They differed in that each saw the other's preferred
result as a disaster.
Hamilton
may or may not have believed in the threats he warned of, but he was
definitely a patriot, or at any rate thought of himself as one. For
he was surely correct about the states going their own way and making
independent arrangements with foreign, or simply other, states.
Independent states make their own treaties. Hamilton wanted a
constitutional monarchy, and his British
Plan, introduced at the Constitutional Convention included a
“Governor” and Senators elected for life, and state governors
appointed by the national legislature. Hamilton was a visionary, a
genius, and probably a paranoid who saw a United States mortally
threatened during its infancy, but, if protected, growing into a
colossus ruled by a Caesar. That was what he wanted to have happen,
that is what he believed was best, and that is what has happened.
Hamilton's
greatest fear was the nightmare of a continent full of petty states,
like Europe. After the introduction his first three entries in The
Federalist Papers are all on this subject. Here is a sample
of his language:
A
man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only
united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they
might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each
other.
Madison's
primary concern seems to have been Shay's Rebellion that had shaken
the Massachusetts establishment. Shay had been in the continental
army, had loaned money to the Continental Congress to pursue the war,
then had found the Federal Government, without the power of taxation,
could not redeem the bonds and they were almost worthless. On top of
that when he had returned home he found he had lost his land for
debt. He was not the only one thinking he had gotten a raw deal, and
many others were also outraged. A rag-tag army of, some said, 30,000
seemed to grow overnight. To Madison Shay's rebellion was the
ultimate nightmare. Patrick Henry, on the other hand criticized Shay
only for lack of capacity, and Jefferson actually welcomed
the rebellion.
Both
Hamilton and Madison reflexively thought it was necessary to suppress
Shay and his ilk with force. Here is Hamilton:
"Should
a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the
others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they
are reformed by those that remain sound.
“Quell” and “remain sound” are
for curing diseases. The Union is the cure.
Here
Madison:
The
insurrections in Massts. admonished all the States of the danger to
which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. P. contained no
provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this
point. According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power
being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous.
According to fact & experience, a minority may in an appeal to
force be an overmatch for the majority. 1. 15 If
the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill &
habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary
resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2. 16 one
third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be
rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty
disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons
may 17be
more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of
the 18 established
Government. 3. 19 where
slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.
The
appeal to force and repression is direct. So it is clear that the
American Constitution is a Draconian alliance of the rich for the
repression of the poor. Neither Shay, who would have been the proper
representative of the poor, nor anyone sympathetic to him, ever
ratified the Constitution. That was done entirely within the state
legislatures. However, what the Constitution created was something
almost new, a Republic, and this threw a monkey wrench into the
workings of the rich. For we must remember that it is Patrick Henry
and other rich men who opposed the Constitution on the grounds that
it restricted their freedom. Henry would never have been in Shay's
shoes, but here he was in apparent alliance with him.
The
Constitution of the United States created a new body politic where
there never had been one. Henry feared that the federal government,
once created, would have interests of its own. He conjured up a
constitutional tyrant repressing the states. In this he was on the
money. Henry, Madison, Monroe, Jefferson and similar others ruled
Virginia very comfortably. Their freedom consisted in being able to
shape the world around them with others who talked it out with them
and acted from a sense of justice. Having to talk to others, equals,
face to face, was what kept them honest. That, what they called
“freedom,” was what they would lose. Oh they would still be able
to talk, but they would not be able to manage the life around them.
The federal government, with its ability to tax the citizens directly
and raise an army, would be a power all its own which, of necessity,
would repress the states and so take away this freedom. The Civil War
decided the issue once and for all. Henry was right and he lost.
It
is hard to believe that Hamilton, who thought only force and interest
could rule men, ever believed in the checks and balances of the
constitution. Henry certainly never did. But such constructs of
government were all the rage in those days, and it seems almost
certain that Madison had real faith in them. The Enlightenment had
changed the idea of law to correspond to its new idea of natural law.
Natural law, like Newton's law of gravitation, had come to consist
of a set of procedures. Each of these procedures when done carefully,
produced a predictable result. But Enlightenment men did not think of
them as a set of procedures, but as revelations about the laws of
nature. Newton's Law of Gravitation gave people license to think we
knew how all things worked in the cosmos, for it applied both on
earth and in the heavens. We still live with this epistemological
commitment. No one noticed that Newton's gravitational formula can
describe any
eliptical or hyperbolic planetary path depending upon the masses and
initial velocities involved. But these numbers were just plugged in
to make the orbits what we already knew to be right. The game was
circular, but no one was good enough at math to see it. The idea that
science examines nature (which is somehow always found in the
laboratory) obscures science's real nature as a collection of recipes
for operations that, done carefully, produce predictable results.
Everybody thought of the Enlightenment as having discovered the real
truth about everything. The universe was merely a succession of
repeatable procedures. It ran, as it were, on rails. Since such
procedures were ideal for producing commodities, the rapid creation
of wealth cemented the belief. Mass production here we come, but the
idea of life as made up of a complex of rigid procedures, the
Enlightenment idea, infected the Constitutional Convention. Belief in
rigid procedures —the checks and balances and election rituals--
substituted for belief in the one true citizen, Solon and in his good
will, as essential for law's success. The checks and balances, rules
for human behavior, could, it was thought, be specified. These
procedures would cancel out private interests automatically so that
only the interest of the whole would result. Madison specifically
renounces and hope for good will in Federalist
10.
It is
in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the
public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.
Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without
taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will
rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find
in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The
Constitution was, so to speak, Draconian rather than Solonic, that is
an alliance of the rich against the Shay and the poor rather than a
peace treaty between rich and poor. But it was also Solonic as a
peace treaty between the rich and the Federal government. The
anti-federalists feared the new body politic itself wold be a
constitutional tyrant. Whereas in Greece the poor sought protection
from the rich, here the rich seek protection from the government. It
is for this that an American Solon was needed. For that Solon we
have the checks and balances.
The
new Solon was “due process.” The founding fathers counted on the
governmental processes to preserve their freedom. Men are
self-interested and the best we can do is try to balance these
interests so that, in the tug of war, the general interest will
emerge. “We are a nation of laws, not of men,” is a description
of just this reliance on process rather than good will.
It
is interesting to compare the Bill of Rights to other earlier laws.
Earlier laws are about who owes what to whom, who had the right to
hunt where, who has the right to tax whom, and the like. There is
nothing like the right to free assembly or the right to free speech
or freedom of the press, all of which seem not to be a question of
one person's interests over another's. These are rights one needs to
oppose a government structured upon ideas, a government that,
supposedly, can be opposed or persuaded through argument. The
separation of powers, election of officials, and shortly after
ratification, the Bill of Rights were supposed to protect against
constitutional tyranny. Many believed it would work. Henry and
Jefferson did not. Henry was one of the few who saw no problem with
the Articles of Confederation. He believed that free men in the
states could protect themselves without such a repressive structure
as he saw the new Federal State to be.
This
Enlightenment faith in procedure was not only American, but took hold
wherever the Enlightenment spread. In France, The Declaration of the
Rights of Man is full of principles that are to be secured by law.
The Code
Napoleon supposedly
created
the system of procedures for France. This all came crashing down
with the Dreyfus affair that I treat with more detail here.
The
Dreyfus Affair revealed that the system of procedures could not
insure justice and in fact mitigated against it. At the time it was
quite clear to everybody. Zola's J'accuse
is
about how, with the Dreyfus Case, France betrays it's foundation in
The
Declaration of the Rights of Man. He
mentions antisemitism only once. Even Theodor Hertzl, for whom The
Dreyfus case was a revelation of eternal antisemitism, saw the case
as a repudiation of France's deepest principles. What was so
appalling was that to implicate Dreyfus court officials introduced
flagrantly false evidence. They went through the motions, the
procedures and produced a mockery. Their shameless falsehoods flew in
the face of reason itself, but when they refused to withdraw what to
any reasonable man were outrageous forgeries, there was nothing
within the law to stop them.
Franz
Kafka's story In
the Penal Colony
illustrates perfectly what had happened. In it, the penal colony has
inherited a machine for administering justice from an earlier
“Commandant.” The machine is the centerpiece for the whole penal
colony which is itself a machine meant to run by itself.
We who were
his friends knew even before he died that the organization of the
colony was so perfect that his successor, even with a thousand new
schemes in his head, would find it impossible to alter anything, at
least for many years to come.
The
colony was a process resistant to human intervention. The machine is
designed to operate a set of needles to write the criminals crime on
his back in wounds. A tattoo of words kills him. The officer, who
runs the show, explains it in French, which the soldier and the
condemned man don't understand. Even though the officer tasked with
administering the punishment was there at the machine's construction,
he does not know how to fix it. Anyway, he can't get parts. The
machine is falling apart. No one any longer knows how it was supposed
to work. When the officer finally subjects the prisoner to it, it
mangles him horribly and writes nothing on his back.
The
justice system of the West, set up as a machine for justice meant to
run rigidly according to strict procedures, has substituted
procedure-following for justice. Supreme Court Justice Scalia's
infamous comment
reveals this:
"This
Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later
able to convince a habeas court that he is "actually"
innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that
question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any
claim based on alleged "actual innocence" is
constitutionally cognizable."
The
quotes around “actual innocence” sets it off against innocence
found through the procedures of the law. That he didn't do the crime
is irrelevant if the procedures produced a “guilty” verdict.
Scalia is not being a monster here unless being a good judge is being
a monster. For he is just following what every lawyer learns in law
school. The result of the procedures is what matters. All else is
juvenile folderol. How the machine was supposed to work no one can
tell. It is outside our ken.
The
hope that rigid procedure, law, as it were, on rails, could
substitute for good will, was vain. Wittgenstein has shown decisively
that nothing written can dictate rule-following, even in the most
basic case, that of counting. If someone insists he is obeying the
rules in following 1000 with 1002 we might banish him from further
math study, or even send him to the insane asylum, but what we cannot
do is show him where he is wrong by pointing to a rule. For he will
insist he is following it. Mathematics works because of a rigid
training. It is a tyranny, a tyranny of teachers, not marks on a
page. Those who won't or can't obey are thrown out.
Since
law is a peace treaty between two classes who have no good will but
see ending their hostilities as more important than some of their
private interests, both sides want to reinterpret the law in
their own favor. If the guarantee for the laws fair interpretation is
not good will but some rigid procedure, both sides are free to
exercise themselves fully to have things go their way within the
letter of the law. The reliance on procedure is a license to pursue
self-interest. Since laws do not actually prescribe anything unless
there is good will, it is quite easy to manipulate them. For example:
In
the United States the use of the phrase "enemy
combatant" was used after 9/11 by the Bush administration to
include an alleged member of al Qaeda or the Taliban being
held in detention by the U.S. government as part of the war on
terror. In this sense, "enemy combatant" actually refers to
persons the United States regards as unlawful combatants, a
category of persons who do not qualify for prisoner-of-war status
under the Geneva Conventions.
To
circumvent the law one need merely rename someone so that they fall
outside the category. Want to circumvent labor laws, rename the
workers “independent contractors.” Can't have an office slave?
Call her an “intern.” “War?” no, “kinetic military
action.” Conversely, if you want to include some entity under the
protection of the law, use the same trick in reverse. A corporation
is a “person;” money is “speech.” But these are only the
most obvious techniques. Techniques are limited only by human
ingenuity itself. Perhaps the law has a spirit as well as a letter,
but rigid procedures refer only to the letter, and it can be twisted
to mean anything. The faith in procedure is misplaced and relieves
the parties, especially the rich, of the obligation of good will,
essential to the success of any system of law. And thus we see the
ever more Kafkaesque government going ever further along the rails as
law is piled upon law in the vain attempt to turn human action into
procedures done on rails of written language. We imagine these
procedures forged of steel but they are woven of cobwebs.
Constitutions are the putative frameworks for societies. Societies are hierarchies operating through vertical interactions, mostly transactions, enforced by the threat of coercive violence. Communities cohere through voluntary, horizontal interactions, only some of which are transactions. Societies control those horizontal transactions to varying degrees, through prescription, proscription and monitoring.
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